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POWER TO THE PEOPLE: WHY WE NEED FULL FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF ELECTRICAL TRANSMISSION
REGULATION
Max Hensley*
State and federal governments have made significant investments in the develop-
ment and installation of renewable energy technology. However, further increases
in renewable power use have been stymied by the continued mismatch between the
national interest in connecting consumers with utility-scale wind and solar instal-
lations and state and local control over the siting of electrical transmission lines.
Because renewable power potential is often located far from consumers, transmis-
sion lines must cross multiple jurisdictions whose local interests have tended to
prevent or significantly delay development. This Note analyzes that disconnect, re-
views academic and legislative proposals to overcome it, and proposes a way for the
federal government to preempt the states in order to streamline construction of the
needed infrastructure while maintaining consideration of local concerns and ad-
vancing the overarching policy goal of shifting the electrical grid towards renewable
power.
INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2010, high waters fed the hydroelectric dams
on the Columbia River that have long produced the majority of the
Pacific Northwest's electricity. At the same time, huge amounts of
wind coursed through the wind farms throughout the region that
had been constructed over the past decade. The Bonneville Power
Administration (BPA)-the agency that administers the electrical
grid in the Northwest-faced a unique problem: too much renewa-
ble power.' The overload threatened the integrity of the grid as a
whole.2 In response, the BPA stopped accepting power from coal
and nuclear plants in the area.3
* Max Hensley received a J.D. form the University of Michigan Law School in 2013.
1. See Peter Behr, Bonneville Power to Wind Generators-Shut Down and You Get Free Power,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2011, http://www.nyfimes.com/cwire/2011/O2/25/25climatewire-
bonneville-power-to-wind-generators-shut-dow-22723.html; Hal Bernton, Wind-Power Producers
Fight Possible Shutdown of Turbines, SFArms TIMES, Apr. 12, 2011, http://seattletimes.nw-
source.com/html/localnews/2014756586_windpowerl3m.html; Kim Murphy, Wind Power
and Water Power Collide in Northwest, SATTnL TIMES, Jun. 26, 2011, http://seattletimes.nw-
source.com/html/localnews/2015435248_webenergy27.html; Tilting at Windmills: Teething
Troubles in the Clean-energy Sector, THE ECONOMIST, Jun. 16, 2011 [hereinafter Tilting at Wind-
mills], available at http://www.economist.com/node/18836410.
2. See Bernton, supra note 1.
3. See Behr, supra note 1.
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This is how renewable power is supposed to work: supplementing
and at times entirely replacing the traditional forms of power gen-
eration that provide the baseline load. 4 However, the 2010 summer
overload was more extreme than in previous years.5 The hydroelec-
tric dams produced so much power that the BPA no longer had
room for the input from wind producers, and the BPA stopped ac-
cepting their power as well.6 As a result, five wind energy producers
in Washington and Oregon sued the BPA on a breach of contract
claim for lost profits and injunctive relief to ensure they would not
face a similar situation in the future. 7
The Columbia Valley renewable energy producers had already
overcome the technological barriers of turning wind into electricity
and the economic barriers of installing utility-scale wind farms.
They had succeeded. Yet the nation's failure to expand its aging
and overburdened system of electrical infrastructure-the grid-
stopped these producers from actually providing low-cost green en-
ergy to consumers.8 These limited, congested, and aging lines are
unable to shift power efficiently around the country from the places
it is being produced to the places it is needed.9 In fact, at the same
time that the BPA was refusing to accept wind power, California
ratepayers were paying nearly twice as much per kilowatt-hour as
consumers in Washington and Oregon because of California's high
demand for power and relatively limited supply.'0
Although the Northwest has been one of the more aggressive
adopters of renewable energy in the United States,1' the challenges
of an aging and inadequate electrical grid are not unique to that
4. See id. (noting the BPA's efforts to replace coal generation with wind and
hydropower).
5. See id.
6. BPA argues that environmental regulations aimed at protecting salmon limit the
extent to which dam owners such as itself can use spillover to cut the output of hydroelectric
dams. Thus, they are the last in line for shutdowns or power reductions. See Murphy, supra
note 1.
7. Petition for Review under the Northwest Power Act, Cannon Power Group, LLC v.
Bonneville Power Admin., No. 11-72059 (9th Cir. July 21, 2011). See also Behr, supra note 1
(estimating the financial loss to be approximately $50 million).
8. See Tilting at Windmills, supra note 1 ("More effort by BPA to link this new capacity to
grids in California and British Columbia could have avoided the need to idle these wind
turbines ....").
9. See What is the Electric Power Grid, and What are Some of the Challenges it Faces?, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.eia.gov/energy-in-brief/power-grid.cfm.
10. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIsLATUREs, MEETING THE ENERGY CHALLENGES OF
THE FUTuRE: A GUIDE FOR POLcVmAKERs 3 fig.3 (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/doc-
uments/energy/FutureEnergyChallenges07l0.pdf.
11. See Tilting at Windmills, supra note 1 ("The north-west gets more of its power from
hydro than any other region of the United States.").
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area.12 The most dramatic recent example of grid failure came in
2003, when a power station on Lake Erie crashed because of air
conditioner use on an unexpectedly hot day, and a transmission
line in Walton Hills, Ohio shorted out on an untrimmed tree
branch.'3 Within three hours, fifty million people across eight states
and Ontario had lost power, resulting in the largest blackout in
North American history. 14 The blackout lasted a day and a half and
cost the economy $6 billion.1 5
Reliability is one key reason for infrastructure construction, but
new transmission is also necessary to bring the next generation of
power sources-utility-scale renewables-online. Unlike traditional
power plants, which are built to serve their region and can ship in
oil, natural gas, or coal from anywhere in the world, renewable en-
ergy potential is generally concentrated in less populous areas: wind
in the Midwest, solar in the Southwest, and geothermal in the
Mountain West and South. 16 Meanwhile, the highest demand for
electricity is in the Northeast and California.1 7 Despite the need to
link supply and demand, the format of the power grid matches the
regional outlook of the traditional producers.' 8 This disconnect has
been noted at the highest levels of U.S. policymaking, drawing
12. See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 10, at 4 ("Many federal,
state, and utility representatives feel that the transmission system is outdated and overloaded,
which ultimately prevents efficient delivery of electricity, reducing reliability and making en-
ergy more costly."); U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 9 ("It is generally agreed that some
replacement and upgrading of current lines will have to be done, and that new lines need to
be constructed to maintain the system's overall reliability.").
13. Joel Achenbach, The 21st Century Grid: Can We Fix the Infrastructure the Powers Our
Lives?, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC MAG., July 2010, at 3, available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.
com/print/2010/07/power-grid/achenbach-text.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 10, at 22 figs.14-16.
17. Electricity Tends to Flow South in North America, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 12,
2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=4270 (showing interre-
gional power flows).
18. The Eastern Interconnection includes all or parts of thirty-nine states (plus Cana-
dian territories) east of the Rocky Mountains, the Western Interconnection contains all or
part of fourteen states (plus Canadian territories and a small part of Mexico), and the Texas
Interconnection includes most of the state of Texas (Alaska, Hawaii, and Quebec each also
have their own independent interconnections). Id. at 5 fig. 4.
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attention from think tanks,' 9 journalists, 20 and the White House.2 1
The President's Job Council has taken the position that the inade-
quacy of transmission infrastructure is "one of the highest risks
facing the energy industry over the next ten years," and that reform
provides perhaps the best opportunity to maintain America's global
leadership in innovation, cheap power, and job creation. 22
This Note argues that overly localized and inadequate infrastruc-
ture is the most substantial hurdle to the adoption of utility-scale
renewable power, and that federal preemption of transmission sit-
ing authority is the only way to clear it. Part I follows the
development of energy regulation in the United States and explains
the link between local control of infrastructure development and
the continuing flaws in our current system. Part II outlines recent
efforts to reform the current system and argues that these interme-
diate steps toward regional and national control are inadequate.
Part III sets out my proposal for full federal preemption of electri-
cal transmission infrastructure siting. It explains the theoretical
justification for federal action, compares electrical transmission to
similarly preempted fields, and addresses the federalism concerns
that may prevent the adoption of a national policy for siting electri-
cal transmission infrastructure.
I. ADAPTING ENERGY LAW TO THE RENEWABLE POWER FUTURE
Nearly every state, as well as the federal government, has made
the development of renewable energy a priority.23 This support
19. See, e.g., BRACKEN HENDRICKS, WIRED FOR PROGRESS: BUILDING A NATIONAL CLEAN EN-
ERGY SMART GRID 2-3 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/02/
pdf/electricity.grid.pdf (describing how the changing economics of energy demand a shift
away from historical infrastructure patterns).
20. See, e.g., Bradford Plumer, Drunk With Power: The Energy Villain in Your Neighborhood,
TtE NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 2, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/drunk-
power.
21. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITIVENESS, TAKING ACTION, BUILDING
CONFIDENCE: FIVE COMMON SENSE INITIATIVES TO BOOST JOBS AND COMPETITIVENESS 13 (Oct.
2011), available at http://files.jobs-council.com/jobscouncil/files/201 1/10/JobsCouncil_In-
terimReport,-Octl 1 .pdf.
22. Id. at 13-16.
23. See infra note 24-29 and accompanying text. One of the significant assumptions of
this Note is that expanded electric transmission construction would be of substantial benefit
to the development of green energy, and that this is a policy goal worth achieving. However,
both parts of that statement have significant challengers from both ends of the political spec-
trum. First, a substantial portion of the political community remains committed to the
traditional sources of energy and is not interested in advancing renewable technologies.
While the Energy Policy Act of 2005 was developed primarily by then-Vice President Dick
Cheney, Tara Benedetti, Running Roughshod? Extending Federal Siting Authority Over Interstate
Electric Transmission Lines, 47 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 253, 257 (2010), energy policy has become
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comes primarily through tax credits,24 direct loans or loan guaran-
tees25  to power producers, and state renewable portfolio
standards.2 6 Combining these and other smaller programs, the fed-
eral government alone spent approximately $4.6 billion on direct
expenditures and another $8.2 billion in tax credits to promote re-
newable energy in fiscal year 2010.27
However, the potential impact of these policies and the signifi-
cant financial investments that support them are frustrated by the
inability to get renewable power to consumers. While renewable en-
ergy has significant economic, technical, and environmental
hurdles to clear before it can fully replace traditional power
sources, 28 only its regulatory hurdles are self-imposed. Scientists and
engineers may be able to develop cheaper and more efficient tur-
bines or solar cells, but the impact of these discoveries is muted by a
regulatory system that hinders the creation of the infrastructure
substantially more divisive over the last eight years. See generally Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns:
How the Senate and the White House Missed Their Best Chance to Deal with Climate Change, THE NEW
YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 70, available at http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/
11/10101 fafactlizza. This regional, ideological, and partisan divide has stymied many po-
tential reforms. Second, a substantial number of environmental advocates prefer a system of
distributed generation based around technology like rooftop solar and backyard wind tur-
bines. Michael Dorsi, Piedmont Environmental Council v. FERC, 34 HARv. ENVrL. L. REV. 593,
600-01 (2010). Finally, many renewable energy advocates fear that expanded electric trans-
mission would be used not to link stranded wind and solar energy, but to bring previously
inaccessible coal resources into the grid. See, e.g., Rose Jenkins, Higher Power: Will New Energy
Inftastructure Force Land Trusts to Protect the Climate at the Expense of the Land?, SAVING LAND, Fall
2009, at 24, 24. All of these are substantial concerns, but completely resolving any of them is
beyond the scope of this Note. The final concern, however, should be substantially mitigated
by the safeguards discussed in the text, infra notes 98-100.
24. Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWA-
BLE ENERGY (DSIRE), http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre.cfm (last visited Feb.
20, 2013) (listing twenty-five states that offer credits); Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit
(PTC), U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/savings/renewable-electricity-production-
tax-credit-ptc (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
25. Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, supra note 24 (listing forty-eight states that
offer loans or guarantees). See generally Loan Programs Office, U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://
lpo.energy.gov/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013).
26. Financial Incentives for Renewable Energy, supra note 24 (listing thirty-eight states that
have renewable portfolio standards, or RPS). An RPS is a mandate that requires a utility
operating within the jurisdiction to purchase a certain percentage of its power load from
renewable sources.
27. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DREcr FEDERAL FINANCIAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUBSIDIES
IN ENERGY IN FIscAL YEAR 2010 iii tbl.ES2 (2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/
requests/subsidy/.
28. See, e.g., Trieu Mai et al., Renewable Electricity Futures Study, NAT'L RENEWABLE ENERGY
LABORATORY, http://www.nrel.gov/analysis/re-futures/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2013) (four-vol-
ume technical analysis of challenges to widespread renewable power adoption in the United
States).
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necessary to bring renewable power to American consumersY9 To-
day, wind developers have applied for transmission access for
projects whose output would quintuple American wind power pro-
duction.30 These projects, however, have no chance of being built
without substantial upgrades to our transmission system because
the grid is too crowded and does not effectively link the entire na-
tion. 31 In fact, one recent study of five Western states shows that,
without substantial investments in interstate transmission infrastruc-
ture, it would be physically impossible to increase the market share
of wind and solar power beyond 20 percent. Furthermore, even at
that level, the lack of infrastructure would add substantial difficulty
and cost.32 It would be shortsighted to invest heavily in the develop-
ment of renewable power generation and then prevent its use by
maintaining a locally-focused transmission regulatory system that
ensures that transmission will remain suitable only for a world of
localized fossil-fuel generation.
This section briefly outlines the history and development of mod-
ern energy regulation, focusing on the transition of power
generation from a primarily local industry to a national concern. It
then examines the most prominent recent legislative and regula-
tory reforms in greater depth.
A. The Development of Modern Energy Regulation
At the beginning of the twentieth century, generating and trans-
mitting electricity was a purely local activity. Four thousand local
utilities burned coal and produced power for their metropolitan
areas, and links distributing locally produced power between cit-
ies-let alone regions-were rare. 33 Over the past century, as
29. See id. at 3. (A FERC Commissioner and the chief counsel arguing that, "perhaps no
issue is more central to the nation's progress toward a clean energy system than the develop-
ment of a robust electric transmission grid."); Alborz Nowamooz, Inadequacy of Transmission
Lines: A Major Barrier to the Development of Renewable Energy, 3 ENVT'L & ENERGY L. & POL'YJ.
176, 179-80 (2008) ("If our nation is ever to distance itself from fossil fuel dependency, the
immense solar, wind, and geothermal resources that are typically available in remote areas of
this geographically vast country must be utilized. However, use of these resources requires a
national transmission system in place to deliver the energy from these remote areas to our
big cities and surrounding suburbs.").
30. U.S. DEPT. OF ENERGY, 2011 WIND TECHNOLOGIES MARKET REPORT 12 (2012), availa-
ble at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/wind/pdfs/201 l-wind_technologies-market-report.pdf.
31. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON JOBS & COMPETITWENESS, supra note 21, at 14.
32. See DEBRA LEW ET AL., How Do HIGH LEVELs OF WIND AND SOLAR IMPACT THE GRID?
THE WESTERN WIND AND SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY 6-7 (2010), available at http://www.nrel.
gov/docs/fyl0osti/47781 .pdf.
33. What is the Electric Power Grid, and What are Some of the Challenges it Faces?, supra note 9.
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populations grew, generation capabilities increased, and our econ-
omy became more national, the electrical grid became more
interconnected. 34 Yet this has been a process of fits and starts, as the
underlying assumption has been that local ratepayers are ultimately
interested primarily in their own area's power production and
consumption.35
The Federal Power Act (FPA) was passed in 1935, and remains
the primary source of federal regulatory power over the electric in-
dustry to this day.36 Until the passage of the FPA, the entire industry
was regulated exclusively by the states.37 This legislation allowed the
federal government, first through the Federal Power Commission
and later through the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC), to regulate interstate transmission and wholesale interstate
sales of power. However, the FPA specifically limited federal regula-
tion of the industry to "those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States." 38 It also specifically disclaimed federal au-
thority over power generation and local distribution.39 Under this
regulatory scheme, the electric industry developed into numerous
local, vertically integrated monopolies where one company owned
and operated the transmission, generation, and distribution capac-
ity for a local area.40
This system remained fundamentally unchanged for nearly half a
century until Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy
Act of 1978 (PURPA) .41 PURPA attempted to break down local mo-
nopolies in response to the energy crises of the 1970s.42 It did so by
mandating that utilities purchase electricity from small power gen-
erators and by adopting new ratemaking policies that encouraged
local utilities to consider a wider variety of factors beyond the tradi-
tional economic cost model, including more sophisticated pricing
models, integrated resource planning, and energy efficiency and
34. Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 614-15 (2009).
35. Id. at 615 (noting that the Federal Power Act failed to anticipate many of the
changes in the electricity market).
36. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 791-828c (2006)).
37. Jeffery S. Dennis, Twenty-Five Years of Electricity Law, Policy, and Regulation: A Look Back,
25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVT 33, 33 (2010).
38. Federal Power Act § 201(a) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006)).
39. Id. § 201(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2006)).
40. Dennis, supra note 37, at 33.
41. Public Utilites Regulatory Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117
(1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-03, 2611-13, 2621-27, 2631-34, 2641-45 (2006)).
42. See Id. § 2601; Dennis, supra note 37 at 33-34.
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conservation. 43 Combined, these changes kick-started the indepen-
dent power production sector by requiring purchases from small
renewable or cogeneration producers and creating a more
favorable regulatory environment for other independent produc-
ers.44 Utilities and state regulators immediately challenged the law
on constitutional grounds,45 but the Supreme Court held that
PURPA fell squarely within Congress' Commerce Clause authority46
and did not intrude upon States' sovereignty as guaranteed by the
Tenth Amendment. 47
The third major federal statute in this area is the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 (EPAct of 1992).48 Intended to further expand the in-
dependent power production market, the EPAct of 1992 required
utilities to provide transmission to independent power producers
and created an exemption to ownership restrictions for wholesale
energy retailers. 49 These changes expanded the pool of indepen-
dent power producers and abolished some of the major barriers to
linking into the general electrical grid, thereby further promoting
competition in electrical generation. 50
B. Recent Changes
In the last decade, federal policymakers have taken three major
steps in the area of energy regulation, each of which has increased
the role of the federal government and attempted to ease the path
towards the development of additional electrical transmission lines.
Building on each other, these actions have incrementally shifted
energy policy toward the consolidation of authority in the federal
government.
The first significant change was the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct of 2005).51 Section 216 of the EPAct of 2005 gives the FERC
the power to override state decisions on transmission siting within
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-22.
44. Dennis, supra note 37, at 34.
45. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 743 (1982).
46. Id. at 757 ("We agree with appellants that it is difficult to conceive of a more basic
element of interstate commerce than electric energy.").
47. Id. at 759 (holding that Congress's ability to preempt the States completely con-
tained within it the power to preempt them conditionally).
48. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 1776 (1992) (codified at
scattered sections of 2, 11, 15, 16, 25, 26, 30, 31, 38, 42, 43, and 48 U.S.C. (2006)).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 8240) (1992); 15 U.S.C. § 79z-5a (1992) (repealed by the Energy Policy
Act of 2005).
50. Dennis, supra note 37, at 34-35.
51. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Star. 594 (codified at scattered
sections of 7, 10, 15, 16, 22, 26, 40, and 42 U.S.C.).
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specified National Interest Electrical Transmission Corridors
(NIETC) when a state (1) refuses to consider interstate benefits of
additional transmission construction, (2) refuses to consider an ap-
plication for construction of a line because the line would not
deliver power to anyone in that state, (3) withholds approval of new
transmission construction for more than one year, or (4) places
conditions on its approval that would make construction prohibi-
tively expensive or prevent it from reducing congestion. 52 When the
FERC acts, it removes state jurisdiction over the project, grants a
permit holder eminent domain authority, and requires state and
local authorities to cooperate with the construction process. 5
The judiciary twice has weakened the force of this seemingly
powerful tool. The FERC initially determined that "withhold"
under section 216 included scenarios where a state considered a
project but eventually rejected it.54 However, in 2009, the Fourth
Circuit held that the FERC's ability to overrule state jurisdiction was
limited to situations where a state did not consider a project, and
that such authority did not include the power to overturn a legally
justified denial. 55 As a result of this decision, the scope of federal
backstop power to counteract state decisions has been sharply cir-
cumscribed: since the Fourth Circuit's decision, the FERC has
received just one permit application (subsequently withdrawn) for
a program that was intended to substantially spur development of
interstate electrical transmission. 56
In 2011, the Ninth Circuit found that the U.S. Department of
Energy (DOE) also overstepped its statutory boundaries in deter-
mining which areas should be designated as NIETC, the
prerequisite designation for federal intervention in transmission sit-
ing.57 The court held that DOE's designation of two corridors (the
Mid-Atlantic Area and Southwest Area National Corridors) violated
its duty to confer with the affected states under the EPAct of 2005.58
The Court ruled that DOE's "consultation obligations are separate
52. Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 216, 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2006).
53. R. Seth Davis, Conditional Preemption, Commandeering and the Values of Cooperative Feder-
alism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 404, 409-11 (2008).
54. Piedmont Envt'l Council v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 558 F.3d 304, 309-10 (4th
Cir. 2009).
55. Id. at 314-15.
56. Drew Thornley, The Federal Government's Authority to Site Interstate Electric Transmission
Lines: How the Meaning of "Withheld" is Withholding Clarity for Transmission Development, 6 TEx.J.
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 385, 394 (2010).
57. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2011).
58. Id. at 1079-80.
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and distinct from (albeit related to) its notice-and-comment obliga-
tions" and create a substantially higher procedural burden.5 9 Thus,
although DOE had undergone the standard notice-and-comment
procedures for administrative rulemaking, its designation of the
two NIETC was held procedurally deficient.60 The consultation re-
quirements under the EPAct of 2005 were not specifically defined,
but the court clearly required substantially more (and more mean-
ingful) interaction between DOE and the states. 61
The second major policy change resulted from a pair of FERC
orders. FERC Order 888, issued in 1996, imposed mandatory open-
access transmission tariffs on transmitting electricity in interstate
commerce to further promote the growth of independent power
producers and support competition in the wholesale power mar-
ket.62 FERC Order 890, which was finalized in 2007, amended
Order 888 to remove opportunities for discrimination by requiring
state transmission planners to make their plans in the open, coordi-
nate with neighboring states, and develop cost-allocation principles
that encourage regional transmission. 63 The combined effect of
these orders was to substantially lower the burden on independent
power producers-who then, as now, made up a large percentage
of renewable power generators in the United States-to gain access
to the transmission networks they needed to get their power to
consumers.
The third major policy change also resulted from a FERC order,
which further encouraged regional cooperation. FERC Order 1000,
which was issued in the summer of 2011, requires local transmission
planners to participate in regional planning processes. 64 It also re-
quires regional authorities to allow cost recovery for transmission
that is necessary to achieve public policy goals, which include bring-
ing renewable power to market.65 Although prior policy changes
59. Id. at 1088 (quoting U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int'l Trade 33, 40
(2005)).
60. Id.
61. Id. ("Thus, DOE's efforts here fall far short of the efforts that were determined to
meet the requirement [on the EPA under NPDES permitting statutes] in Environmental De-
fense Center [v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003)].").
62. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540-01, 21541 (May 10, 1996). Mandatory open access
tariffs require that transmission operators charge uniform rates to all electricity generators
who send power over the lines, and forbid discrimination between generators.
63. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed.
Reg. 12266-01, 12667-68 2-4 (March 15, 2007).
64. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, 136 FERC 61,051, at 10 (July 21,
2011).
65. Id.
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had indirectly aided the growth of renewable energy by breaking
down some of the rules that propped up the traditional local mo-
nopolies, Rule 1000 took aim at a specific issue important to the
growth of renewable power-the construction of interstate and re-
gional transmission-and explicitly authorized a means of resolving
it.
C. Problems with the Current State of Regulatoiy Policy
While these changes represent substantial progress toward undo-
ing the local gridlock that has stalled the creation of a modern
electrical transmission grid, they are by no means sufficient to re-
solve the major problem that the country faces: the disconnect
between national needs and local authority.66 While Congress and
the FERC have made efforts over the past decade to help transition
to a new energy future, these policy changes continue to build on
the outdated assumption that the industry is primarily local or re-
gional in nature.
Consider as an example the steps needed to build a transmission
line connecting Washington's wind farms and hydroelectric dams
to California customers, a potential solution to the conflict de-
scribed in the Introduction to this Note. Despite the regionalization
urged by PURPA, the EPAct of 1992, FERC Orders 888, 890, and
1000, and the federal backstop authority granted in the EPAct of
2005, a developer must still get approval from a multiplicity of state
and local regulators-each with its own requirements, processes,
and priorities-in order to build the kind of interstate transmission
lines that utility-scale renewable power generation requires.
The line would start in Washington, which has a variety of state
and municipal agencies that have jurisdiction over the various activ-
ities necessary to start construction. 67 Additionally, each affected
county and municipality has the authority to independently regu-
late the siting of transmission lines.68 The line would then cross
through Oregon, which requires a certificate from its Energy Facil-
ity Siting Council (EFSC), "a complicated, multistage undertaking"
66. See, e.g., Richard R. Bradley, Over the Hill and (Around) the Woods to Grandma's House
We Go: Long-term Firm Transmission Rights, Transmission Market Power, & Gaming Strategies in a
Deregulated Energy Market-An International Comparison, 30 Hous. J. INr'L L. 327, 386-22
(2008) (describing responses to the need for expanded transmission in Scandinavia, the Eu-
ropean Union, England, and Argentina, and noting that the most immediately successful
responses have come from nationally owned systems).
67. James A Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the Western United
States: Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 IDAHo L. REv. 379, 417-20 (2010).
68. Id.
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that takes into account local interests, statewide goals, and environ-
mental and historical impacts. 69  EFSC requires multiple
applications, and it must find a locally justified need (which would
presumably rule out consideration of the potential benefits to
Washington or California residents) before it can authorize the pro-
ject to go forward. 0 Finally, California places its siting authority in
its Public Utilities Commission, which is authorized to grant a certif-
icate of public convenience and necessity after an analysis of need,
cost of the project, impact on grid congestion, environmental im-
pact, and proof that there are not other, more cost-effective
alternatives.71 These extensive requirements add, at minimum,
years to any new development, and the financial resources and time
required for the permitting process alone can make projects un-
economical.72 Nevertheless, nearly everyone involved in this arena
agrees that substantial new transmission construction is necessary if
we want to make the shift to renewable power.
II. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
Because the gap between our future energy needs and our cur-
rent infrastructure is widely recognized, scholars and policymakers
have proposed numerous solutions. These attempted reforms can
be grouped into three different categories. First, a number of states
have reformed their siting processes to make them friendlier to al-
ternative energy in an effort to move forward on their own. Second,
the FERC and local policymakers have attempted to promote re-
gional responses to the problem of infrastructure siting. A third
group of proposals has tried to mitigate the conflicts between state
and federal interests. However, all of these attempts have ultimately
failed to provide a comprehensive solution.
A. State Action
In the absence of federal action, some states have taken the initi-
ative to promote the development of renewable energy.73 While the
69. Id. at 407-08.
70. Id. at 407-13.
71. Id. at 390-92.
72. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON JoBs & COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 21, at 14 (noting that
construction of a line from Virginia to West Virginia took thirteen years to approve, and a
line from Minnesota to Wisconsin more than six).
73. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
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majority of these efforts are too new for a final analysis of their im-
pact on many levels, the gap between the needs of a national energy
policy and the incentives that motivate state policymakers is simply
too wide for state-level efforts to be a viable long-term strategy to
build the transmission infrastructure necessary to support renewa-
ble power. This is best demonstrated by an examination of how the
most common prorenewable energy policies have actually been im-
plemented, which reveals the inherent limitations of local action.
One of the primary tools states have adopted to promote renewa-
ble energy generation is the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS),
which mandates that utilities within a state receive a certain per-
centage of energy production from renewable sources.74 However, a
significant number of states have included protectionist limits in
their RPS. For example, at least three states will not credit any out-
of-state production, others limit RPS credits to regional production,
and a third group of states provides a multiplier for in-state produc-
tion. 75 These limits may promote in-state investment and local
economic growth, but they limit the impact of the RPS on the re-
newable energy market as a whole. 76 States simply are not able to
effectively handle problems that cross their borders, while an en-
ergy project must extend to wherever the resource is located.
B. Regional Efforts
Recognizing this fundamental problem, Congress, the FERC,
and a number of states have urged regional solutions. Regional
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) are the primary method by
which authority has been consolidated in recent years. Voluntarily
formed by an assortment of utilities and state regulators with strong
encouragement from the FERC, RTOs are tasked in many parts of
the country with operating the transmission system, managing con-
gestion, and administering the regional wholesale electricity
market.77 FERC Order 1000 mandates that localities that are not
covered by an RTO-approximately one-third of the consumer
74. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
75. Rules, Regulations, and Policies for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR
RENEWABLE ENERGY, http://dsireusa.org/summarytables/rrpre.cfm (last visited Feb. 20,
2013) (compiling links to detailed descriptions of each state's particular RPS).
76. See, e.g., Nathan Enrud, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Their Continued Validity and
Relevance in Light of the Dormant Commerce Clause, The Supremacy Clause, and Possible Federal Legis-
lation, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 259, 264-65 (2008).
77. See Dennis, supra note 37, at 36-37.
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market as of 2010 7 8-enter into an analogous process that would
accomplish similar goals on a regional level. 79
Three failed federal legislative proposals would have worked
along similar lines to encourage regional cooperation. Senator By-
ron Dorgan introduced the National Energy Security Act of 2009,
which would have required regional authorities to designate "clean
energy superhighways," and then grant the FERC sole power over
siting within those areas.8 0 Alternatively, Senator Jeff Bingaman's
National Clean Energy Superhighway Act (and its House compan-
ion sponsored by Representative Jay Inslee), also introduced in
2009, would have granted siting power to those regional authorities
under the supervision of the FERC.81 These bills were not passed
into law,8 2 and neither was reintroduced during the 112th
Congress.
Although FERC Order 1000 was a strong step towards strength-
ening the creation and operation of RTOs, it also began the process
of inter-RTO cooperation, which hints at the problems that will un-
dercut the effectiveness of a regional solution. While any expansion
of geographic jurisdiction is a step in the right direction, any RTO
is still limited to a comparably small part of the country. For exam-
ple, the California Independent System Operator and the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas do not even include their entire
states.83 These organizations, along with the New York ISO, do not
cross state lines.8 4 The Southwest Power Pool and Midwest ISO do
include multiple states, but are primarily made up of areas that will
be renewable energy exporters and do not include the major mar-
kets that will consume that power.8 5 In the Columbia River example
which introduced this Note, none of the Washington or Oregon
utilities are covered by an RTO, while the far northern California
78. See id. at 37.
79. See Energy and Natural Resources Market Regulation 2010 Annual Report, 2010 ENV'T EN-
ERGY & RESOURCES L.: YEAR Rrv. 180, 187 (2010).
80. See S. 774, 111th Cong. (2009).
81. See S. 1462, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2211, 111th Cong. (2009).
82. Benedetti, supra note 23.
83. See Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), FED.
ENERGY REG. COMM'N (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/
rto.asp.
84. Id.
85. The PJM Interconnection is the only RTO that includes both relatively rural power-
exporting areas and a portion of the highly congested coastal power grid, and thus could be
seen as a model for future geographic consolidations. However, it is facing substantial inter-
nal conflict, with western utilities resisting many of the grid upgrades that their eastern
counterparts are pushing for. See Ill. Commerce Comm'n v. Fed Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
576 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2009) (Illinois and Ohio utilities suing over the cost allocation of a
transmission line built between West Virginia and Virginia).
1374 [VOL. 46:4
Full Preemption of Transmission Regulation
utilities are not included in the California ISO.86 Regionalization is
a step in the right direction, but a truly national regulatory system
must emerge to solve a truly national issue.
C. Federal Backstop or Mediation
Another approach to bridging the gap between state-level poli-
cymaking and issues of national concern has been to establish
federal authority as a backstop. Although this was widely under-
stood to be the intent of section 216 of the EPAct of 2005, the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Piedmont Environmental Council v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission made that authority functionally
useless .8
7
One previously proposed piece of legislation would have over-
turned the holding in Piedmont by amending section 216 to grant
the FERC backstop authority whenever a state "denies" or is "other-
wise unable to approve" permits for a transmission project in an
NIETC. 88 This bill, sponsored by Senator Ben Nelson (Democrat
from Nebraska), would have allowed the FERC to override a state's
rejection or non-consideration of permits necessary for such con-
struction, thereby specifically overturning the Fourth Circuit's
decision in Piedmont. Although it did not pass, this legislation also
would have created a presumption of federal authority within feder-
ally-defined "energy superhighways."8 9
One prominent practitioner believes that section 215 of the
EPAct of 2005 could provide some of the necessary authority that
the FERC exercised under section 216 before the Piedmont decision
and which the Nelson legislation would have restored.90 Section 215
imposes a national requirement that all local transmission system
owners and operators follow FERC-established reliability stan-
dards.° 1 To the extent that a state's rejection of a potential
transmission project threatens national or local grid reliability, the
FERC has the authority to step in and overrule that decision.
9 2
86. Id.
87. See supra notes 54-56 and accompany text; Thornley, supra note 56, at 394 (noting
that, post-Piedmont, "Only one [NIETC] permit application has been filed, which was subse-
quently withdrawn by the applicants.").
88. SMART Energy Act, S. 807, 11th Cong. § 224(e) (2)(A)-(B) (2009).
89. Benedetti, supra note 23.
90. See Catherine R. Connors et al., Transmission Preemption, 148 Pun. UTIL. FORT., no. 11,
2010, at 46.
91. Id. at 47.
92. See id. at 50-51.
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The exact boundaries of this authority are unclear and would
certainly be subject to substantial litigation. 93 However, even advo-
cates of section 215 note the limitations of this authority: if the
transmission line is not needed for grid reliability but for some
other purpose (including the promotion of renewable energy), this
backstop authority would not be available because section 215 ap-
plies only to reliability (as opposed to section 216, which contains a
public policy exception).94
Federal backstop authority, whether created through new legisla-
tion or the reinterpretation of existing language, would be a step in
the right direction, but it is ultimately too incremental to overcome
the problems facing a state or regional approach. Requiring devel-
opers to first apply for state permits and then be rejected or
ignored before federal authority is activated would simply delay the
permitting process without adding any benefits.
A related academic proposal urges the creation of a dispute-reso-
lution mechanism when local and national interests diverge.
According to its proponents, this proposal has the advantage-simi-
lar to the backstop concept-of maintaining some traditional state
control while providing a voice for national policy concerns when
the national problems rise to a particularly compelling level.95 Sup-
porters also note that mediation is a commonly used tool in
resolving land use disputes, and costs less and moves faster than
traditional litigation.96 A further advantage is that mediation allows
for the inclusion of a variety of interested parties, including the
general public, who have a range of unique concerns and whose
approval can grant a particularly powerful legitimacy to a project.97
It should be noted, however, that many of the public participa-
tion advantages of mediation could be achieved through a well-
designed federal regulatory scheme. 98 There is no reason to believe
that federal regulators are less interested or less able to take note of
individual objections to a particular project. Additionally, they are
able to consider those objections in a broader context that recog-
nizes benefits that may extend beyond the jurisdictional boundaries
of states.99 As noted previously, one of the most significant
93. See id.
94. See id. at 51.
95. Michael Diamond, Note, "Energized" Negotiations: Mediating Disputes over the Siting of
Interstate Electric Transmission Lines, 26 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 217, 219-20 (2011).
96. Id. at 248.
97. See id. at 250-52.
98. See, e.g., Benedetti, supra note 23, at 264 (noting that the SMART Act would require
the FERC to consider "input from all interested parties").
99. See Diamond, supra note 95, at 229-30 (noting both political constraints and explicit
legal bars on state consideration of a potential project's out-of-state benefits).
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problems with the current system of state authority is that many
projects cross multiple state lines and thus must receive approval
from multiple jurisdictions. 100 Each argument for providing a more
efficient mechanism to resolve federal-state jurisdictional disputes
only underscores the need for avoiding such disputes altogether.
The fundamental flaw of all of these approaches is that they at-
tempt to mitigate the problems of using a nineteenth-century
framework to regulate a twenty-first-century electrical grid. Even
those who oppose full federal preemption recognize the need for
action and acknowledge the costs of allowing near-sighted states to
stymie the growth of renewable energy development. 01 Rather than
adding on to the existing structure, moving forward requires a new
center of authority that is capable of handling the entire system-
not just patchwork parts. Of course, a fundamental overhaul of
state-federal relations is not an easy task, and a number of eco-
nomic, legal, environmental, and political hurdles stand in the way.
III. FULL FEDERAL PREEMPTION
Given the scope of the problem and the inadequacy of existing
proposals for reform, a fundamental shift in the principles that
guide the regulation of electrical transmission is necessary. A truly
national solution is the only way to overcome decades of parochial
inertia in the electrical industry and create a modem infrastructure
that can support a nationally integrated grid powered by large-scale
renewable energy producers. The simplest and best way to accom-
plish this goal is to grant the FERC complete regulatory authority
over the transmission of electricity in or substantially affecting inter-
state commerce, including the intrastate transmission necessary to
bring projects online. Purely local distribution that connects con-
sumers to the grid would remain locally regulated, as long as it did
not inhibit national projects. This proposal shifts the baseline from
a system of general local control with pockets of federal regulation
in a few enumerated areas to a federal default that allows local au-
thority to manage a specific and limited part of the field.
My proposal has four key elements: (1) granting the FERCjuris-
diction over the siting of electrical transmission infrastructure
100. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
101. Benedetti, supra note 23, at 257 (describing Pennsylvania's successful disruption of a
line from West Virginia to NewJersey and Connecticut's struggle to prevent a line through its
waters that linked New England and New York.). See Diamond, supra note 95, at 230 ("In
most states, parochialism casts a significant, although not always determinative, shadow over
the process.").
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necessary for a reliable grid that connects consumers to renewable
energy, (2) a comprehensive consultation mandate that engages
states, local governments, and other interested stakeholders, (3) a
requirement that the FERC ensure that new transmission capacity
will actually accomplish the renewable power and reliability goals
that justify the Commission's authority, and (4) the maintenance of
local control over local distribution.
The grant of jurisdiction is the most important element of the
proposal and should be as broad as possible. Textually, it could be
modeled off of the existing power that the FERC holds under the
Natural Gas Act, which was passed when the pipeline industry
shifted from a local and regional focus to a national one and which
gave the federal government exclusive and complete regulatory
control over the siting of natural gas pipelines necessary for a func-
tional interstate transmission system. 10 2
The consultation mandate is the necessary counter to the pro-
posed expansive new power over siting. It should mimic the higher
levels of consultation that the Ninth Circuit applied to the FERC's
powers under the EPAct of 2005,103 but should be expanded to in-
clude local governments, tribes, property owners, and other
stakeholders beyond simply states. While consultation has the po-
tential to slow the permitting process down, it is essential to
mitigate the loss in local control that federal preemption would cre-
ate. One particularly effective way to implement these consultation
requirements would be to require the creation of regional FERC
offices that would be able to coordinate projects from outside
Washington, D.C. 10 4
The policy requirement is drawn from a previous, failed piece of
legislation: Senator Harry Reid's proposal that each line built under
enhanced federal authorization be available to carry at least 75 per-
cent green energy.105 While a specific percentage requirement may
not be the most effective way to guarantee that the needed links are
102. See infta notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
103. Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1087-89 (9th Cir.
2011).
104. For a similar system, see the Environmental Protection Agency's ten regional offices,
each independently responsible for a multistate area but implementing the same policies and
practices throughout the country.
105. Clean Renewable Energy and Economic Development Act ("CREEDA"), S. 539,
111th Cong. § 404 (2009). For other failed legislative proposals, see supra notes 80, 81, and
88.
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built, keeping a strong connection between increased infrastruc-
ture and a growing renewable energy sector is crucial to ensure that
the FERC's new authority is not used for other ends. 10 6
Finally, I suggest that local entities maintain control over distri-
bution, as there is no reason for the federal government to step in
and take over local distribution. How power gets to homes and busi-
nesses has no impact on the generation and transmission of power,
and there is no need for more radical reforms than necessary to
accomplish the goal of increasing the capacity of the grid to achieve
a greater market share for renewable power.
The remainder of this section will explain the theoretical justifi-
cations for such a proposal, describe other markets where the
federal government has similarly preempted local control, more
fully outline the best practices this reform should adopt, and ad-
dress the fundamental federalism concerns that this reform raises.
A. Theoretical Justifications for Preemption
The crucial reason for elevating control over electrical transmis-
sion siting to a national level is to control externalities. An
externality occurs when a particular activity imposes either costs
(negative externalities) or benefits (positive externalities) on peo-
ple who are not engaged in that activity. Because those costs or
benefits are not factored into the price of the activity, they distort
the level at which it occurs. By internalizing all costs and benefits,
the activity will take place at the socially optimal level. Administra-
tive law scholar Richard Revesz has noted that the theoretical basis
for externalities (unlike the "race to the bottom") is "analytically
unimpeachable, ' 1 0 7 and Justice Stephen Breyer included externali-
ties in his seminal work on administrative law as one of three
primary market failures that justify regulation. 0
In environmental law, where much of the most important work
on externalities has been done, the paradigmatic example of nega-
tive externalities arises when a state benefits from economic activity
106. See Jenkins, supra note 23, at 24 (discussing the fear of environmental groups that
enhanced transmission construction could connect consumers with stranded coal resources
rather than renewable power).
107. Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Interstate Environmental Externalities, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 2341, 2346 (1996) [hereinafter Revesz, Externalities].
108. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REomv 15-34 (1982) (locating externalities
alongside controlling monopoly power and inadequate information as uncontested justifica-
tions for regulation).
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and is then able to export pollution across state lines. 10 9 The prob-
lem in the context of this Note, however, is that states are not able
to internalize the positive externalities of infrastructure construc-
tion. States are being asked to suffer environmental or other land-
use harms caused by the construction of transmission lines, but are
not able to take advantage of the benefits-the jobs and economic
activity created at the point of production and the access to electric-
ity and lower prices for the end user at the point of consumption.
Consequently, many states are less likely to invest in substantial
transmission construction. Because the FERC would be able to con-
sider the costs and benefits across all affected areas (as opposed to a
state regulator who is limited to her particular jurisdiction), it
would be better at determining the level of transmission construc-
tion that would create the maximum benefits for the country as a
whole.
A complementary justification comes from public choice theory,
which posits that larger and more diffuse groups will have a dispro-
portionately small impact on public policy in the face of smaller,
better organized, and better financed opposition." 0 Within the
field of environmental protection, where public choice theory is
commonly applied, Revesz points out that the remedy of federal
regulation can actually intensify the problem by increasing the
number of decision makers and the complexity of the decision-
making process."' By further increasing the number of already-dif-
fuse groups, federal oversight can create local-federal conflicts
among loosely affiliated groups.112
Application of public choice theory to energy law, however, cre-
ates interesting consequences.' 2  At the local level, land-use
advocates may be the smaller and more organized constituency, es-
pecially when compared to power consumers, who are the major
constituency for transmission construction but are generally un-
likely to be aware of that fact. Power companies have some sway but
are severely limited by regulatory obligations. Under public choice
theory, the result is that those who often oppose transmission con-
struction have the greatest degree of influence on public policy
109. See Revesz, Externalities, supra note 107, at 2343.
110. See Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis,
115 HARv. L. REv. 553, 559 (2001).
111. See id. at 559-60.
112. See id. at 561-63.
113. See generally Lincoln Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46
IDAHo L. REv. 473 (2010) (explaining how the disparate roots and forms of analysis of energy
and environmental law create unusual and unexpected consequences when they come to-
gether in the renewable energy arena).
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surrounding that construction. In this scenario, a transition to fed-
eral regulation may be enough to increase the size of the diffuse
group in order to overcome the organizational capacity of local an-
ticonstruction advocates.1 1 4
In considering these theories together, it is helpful to put forth a
hypothetical situation to explore the potential costs and benefits of
transmission construction. For instance, a line could connect a re-
newable resource in one state with a consumer base in another, but
would need to pass through a third state to do so. In this scenario,
the transmission line would not be built under the current state-
based system of regulation, because the negative land use impacts
in the transmitter state would trump the benefit of a few in-state
construction jobs and broad-based grid improvement. The exter-
nality issue is clear: the ability of the transmitter state to halt
construction denies both the producer and consumer states sub-
stantial benefits, even though construction would improve net
welfare. The positive externalities would go unrealized, because the
power to engage in construction would reside with a state that
would experience predominantly negative effects if the construc-
tion were to take place. Public choice theory supports the argument
that elevating the decision point to the federal level will allow for
consideration of all relevant voices, including the numerous (but
notably less-interested) consumers far from the site of transmission.
B. Comparable Systems
Full federal preemption of electrical transmission regulation may
constitute a fundamental overhaul of the traditionally local electric-
ity market, but it has substantial precedent in other policy areas. In
fact, federal authority is almost universal in other areas of infra-
structure that, like electrical transmission, link Americans together,
providing further evidence that the current system is a relic of a
bygone age and should be abandoned.
An early historical example of federal preemption is the creation
of the cross-country railroad. Recognizing the pressing national
114. The first in Revesz's famous trio of articles on the theoretical justifications for na-
tional regulation addresses the "race to the bottom." Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating
Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Reg'u-
lation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 1210 (1992). Revesz convincingly shows fundamental flaws with that
initially plausible story. See id. at 1233-35. However, transmission siting faces the opposite
problem: state regulation is too strong, unnecessarily deterring investment. The NIMBY (not-
in-my-backyard) issue requires the opposite solution-a federal ceiling for state regulation,
rather than a floor-and Revesz specifically disclaims applying his analysis to this question,
id. at 1219 n.24, and that analysis is thus not included within this Note.
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need to link the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts, the federal government
offered enormous incentives to private corporations in a series of
laws passed between the 1830s and 1870s. l' 5 These laws provided
for land grants of right-of-ways that were 200 feet wide and direct
subsidies that totaled over 130 million acres of public land. 116 Be-
cause the vast majority of the construction took place on federal
land, the conflict between state and federal authority that domi-
nates so many discussions of this kind was in some degree moot.
However, the federal government recognized that no otherjurisdic-
tion was capable of acting on the necessary scale and thus took
action."17
More recently, the federal government designed and funded the
interstate highway system. Although state departments of transpor-
tation completed the actual construction, federal authorities
approved the routes." 8 With a few exceptions, federal policymakers
got their way, and crucial economic development and national se-
curity goals for the system were realized. 1 9
The telecommunications industry also provides a useful parallel.
Like electrical power distribution, it arose as a local activity until
advances in technology made long-distance calls both technically
and economically feasible. The Telecommunications Act of 1934
gave the FCC authority over interstate telecommunications traffic,
but maintained local control over local calls.120 This division of la-
bor between state public utility commissions and the Federal
Communications Commission led to a regulatory system that gave
rise to the Bell monopoly. 21 However, the divide between local and
interstate telephone service eventually collapsed as new technol-
ogy-originally introduced in the 1940s and 1950s-allowed the
same lines to carry both types of calls.1 22 The continued enforce-
ment of regulations that relied on the local-long distance divide in
115. Danaya C. Wright, The Shifing Sands of Property Rights, Federal Railroad Grants, and
Economic History: Hash v. United States and the Threat to Rail-to-Trail Conversions, 38 ENVrL. L.
711, 713 (2008).
116. Id.
117. See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Transportation: A Legal History, 30 TRaNsp. L.J. 235,
248-50 (2003).
118. Id. at 313-14; Richard F. Weingroff, Essential to the National Interest, 69 PUB. RoADs,
no. 5, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/publications/publicroads/06mar/07.
cfm.
119. Dempsey, supra note 117, at 313-14.
120. See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform, 97
COLUM. L. REv. 835, 843 (1997).
121. See id. at 839-42.
122. See id. at 841-42 (noting that regulators made only "nominal" efforts to determine
actual use patterns).
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the face of technology that had made that distinction irrelevant
stymied effective regulation and development of the industry.1 23
In response, the 1996 Telecommunications Act gave the FCC au-
thority to preempt any state or local law that inhibits the provision
of telecommunications services, whether inter- or intrastate. 12 4
While overall reception of the 1996 Act has been mixed-largely
because of the impact of unanticipated new technologies, such as
cellular telephones-this is a clear example of regulatory authority
shifting from states and localities to the federal government in re-
sponse to an industry's technological advancements.
Because of the technological shift from landlines to cell phones,
the focus of the FCC's siting authority has shifted from long-dis-
tance telephone wires to local cellular towers. The FCC maintains
the authority to trump local laws that conflict with its infrastructure-
creation goals, including zoning and other land-use regulations. 125
The approach the FCC has chosen is known as "process preemp-
tion," which leaves the decision to approve or deny a siting permit
in local hands, but allows the federal government to mandate the
process by which that decision is made, including the factors to be
considered. 126 Process preemption has proven to be a successful
middle ground because it allows the federal government to pro-
mote a national policy for telecommunications while maintaining
space for local input and, perhaps more importantly, buy-in. 27
The federal government has already taken over regulatory con-
trol of parts of the energy sector based on motivations similar to
those that supported the railroad, highway, and telecommunica-
tions policies. Today, the FERC has full authority over the siting of
natural gas pipelines. 28 This was not always the case. In fact, just
like electricity, pipelines were once seen as a fundamentally local
activity. As the former head of the FERC has noted, "[W]hile the
Federal Power Act remains rooted in an implicit, but now false, as-
sumption that electricity markets are characterized by local
delivery[,] Congress recognized its error with respect to interstate
123. Id.
124. See id. at 859-60.
125. Ashira Perlman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGis. 289, 317-20 (2011).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 292-93. However, while process federalism has also been proposed as a
potential solution to restraints on the development of renewable power generation, see gener-
ally Patricia E. Salkin & Ashira Perlman Ostrow, Cooperative Federalism and Wind: A New
Framework for Achieving Sustainability, 37 HorSTRA L. Rav. 1049 (2009), it does not address the
fundamentally interstate problem of transmission. While process reforms can effectively pro-
mote the creation of single facilities, they cannot break down state borders.
128. 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006)).
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natural gas pipelines and corrected the law... to provide for exclu-
sive and preemptive federal pipeline siting."'129 Section 7 of the
Natural Gas Act, passed in 1938, made this correction by granting
the FERC the full measure of authority that Congress is able to
grant under its Commerce Clause power.130 When the FERC consid-
ers a potential natural gas pipeline, it now undertakes a
comprehensive review, considering economic, engineering, and en-
vironmental issues, along with input from local stakeholders. 13 1
However, the FERC is capable of overruling local laws and regula-
tions when necessary to accomplish a project that has been
approved.1 32
This is an exact parallel to the authority that this Note proposes
giving the FERC with respect to electrical transmission lines. The
FERC is no stranger to either the electricity markets or renewable
energy, given its sole authority over the siting of major hydropower
producers. 33 The fundamental similarities between electrical en-
ergy and the transmission of natural gas or telecommunications
provide strong support for preempting local regulation of electrical
transmission siting.
It is crucial that a federal siting authority adopt the best practices
of these previous examples to ensure that the policy helps promote
renewable energy and fairly considers and mitigates local land-use
concerns. These best practices could include a range of alternatives.
For example, the establishment of regional FERC offices would
lower the barrier to participation by individuals and increase the
FERC's understanding of local issues. Similarly, statutory limits simi-
lar to the heightened "consultation" requirement imposed on the
Department of Energy by the EPAct of 2005 would ensure that
stakeholders are heard during the federal process.13 4 If this is not
done well, federal preemption could result in the invasion of pri-
vate property rights that its opponents fear.
129. Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61
ADMIN. L. REv. 611, 615 (2009)
130. Natural Gas Act § 7 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717f (2006)); Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 120 F.2d 625, 632 (7th Cir. 1941) (holding that
the scope of the federal authority in this area is to be construed liberally), rev'd on other
grounds, 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
131. See Berne L. Mosley & Lauren H. O'Donnell, Penn State Cooperative Extension Pro-
gram: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Process for Siting Natural Gas Infrastructure
(Sept. 8-9, 2010), available at http://extension.psu.edu/naturalgas/presentations/FERC
PipelinePresentation9-9-10.pdf.
132. See id. (explaining how local land use regulations that would prohibit or unreasona-
bly delay a FERC-approved project are preempted).
133. Cf Hydropower, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM'N, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydro-
power.asp (last updated July 16, 2012).
134. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
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C. Federalism Concerns
Presidents of both parties have recognized that the federal gov-
ernment must act with great care when it takes authority over any
area of law away from state or local governments, and have forced
their administrative agencies to justify any expansion of central au-
thority. 135 Similarly, this Note's legislative proposal is certain to face
legal and political pushback on federalism grounds, because it takes
an area traditionally governed by state and local laws and places it
under federal control.
There is no serious constitutional objection to federal preemp-
tion of electrical transmission siting. As the Supreme Court held in
rebuffing a prior commerce clause challenge, "It is difficult to con-
ceive of a more basic element of interstate commerce than electric
energy .... The intrastate activities of these utilities. . . bring them
within the reach of Congress' power over interstate commerce." 136
Another potential challenge could be brought under the Tenth
Amendment, because electrical regulation is a substantive area of
law that was traditionally under state control, but the Supreme
Court has abandoned that line of cases. 137 Even when it was a legally
relevant question, the Supreme Court held that areas of traditional
state dominance could be preempted by the federal government
through Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.138
135. Exec. Order No. 13,132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (Aug. 4, 1999) (Pres. Bill Clinton)
("The national government should be deferential to the States when taking action that af-
fects the policymaking discretion of the States and should act only with the greatest
caution."); Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685 (Oct. 26, 1987) (Pres. Ronald Rea-
gan) ("In the absence of clear constitutional or statutory authority, the presumption of
sovereignty should rest with the individual States.").
136. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 757 (1982). See also New York
v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 31-32 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("Unlike the other electricity components and with the exception of trans-
mission in Alaska, Hawaii, and parts of Texas-transmission is inherently interstate ....
Electricity flows at extremely high voltages across the network in uncontrollable ways and
cannot be easily directed through a particular path from a specific generator to a consumer.
The transfer of electricity from one point to another will, to some extent, flow over all trans-
mission lines in the interconnection, not just those in the direct path of the transfer.")
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
137. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We there-
fore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity
from federal regulation that turns on ajudicial appraisal of whether a particular governmen-
tal function is 'integral' or 'traditional.'").
138. New York v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002). ("Prior to 1935, the
States possessed broad authority to regulate public utilities, but this power was limited by our
cases holding that the negative impact of the Commerce Clause prohibits state regulation
that directly burdens interstate commerce."). See also R. Seth Davis, Conditional Preemption,
Commandeering and the Values of Cooperative Federalism: An Analysis of Section 216 of EPAct, 108
COLUM. L. REv. 404, 420-35 (2008) (arguing that the current state of transmission siting law
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While the constitutionality of federal preemption of energy regu-
lation may not be in question, the same instincts that lead critics to
question the legality of federal control also expose some of the
practical problems it faces. This Note has relied on four cases that
are landmarks in defining the scope of the FERC's authority. While
each of these cases deals with a slightly different substantive ques-
tion of law, there is one very important procedural element that
they all have in common: each involves states attempting to main-
tain their current level of control over transmission regulation. 139
State participation in these lawsuits highlights an important point
about the intransigence of local control. Given that many of these
states are the same ones that have adopted pro-green energy incen-
tives, 140 and that some of the same states have been at the forefront
of their local Regional Transmission Organizations, 141 it is clear that
at least some portion of these states share the FERC's goals in enact-
ing the regulations. Nevertheless, these states opposed the
regulations strongly enough to litigate against them. Even those
states that have done the most to support renewable power on a
local level have joined these lawsuits against the federal government
on the issue of local control. 142
Deciding how to respond to the electrical infrastructure problem
requires states to weigh two distinctly different interests. One is the
maintenance of their own authority, and with it the ability to re-
spond more directly to the needs and values of their constituents.
The other is the fact that a complete response to the expressed will
of their constituents requires that they step aside and allow the fed-
eral government to step in. This balance is not easily struck.143
may fit within Supreme Court precedent but that the analysis exposes analytical weaknesses
in the case law).
139. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. New York, 535 U.S. 1 (1992) (Petitioner New York
joined as a party by the Public Utilities Commissions of nine states, joined as amicus by the
State of California, but respondent FERC joined as amicus by Pennsylvania Public Utilities
Commission); Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (Appellee State
of Mississippi joined by amici Louisiana Public Service Commission, State of Texas, but appel-
lant FERC joined by amici State of Maryland and Department of Energy of the State of
Oregon); Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep't of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir. 2011) (Peti-
tioner Wilderness Coalition joined by interveners Arizona, California, New York, NewJersey,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia); Piedmont Envt'l Council v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n, 558 F.3d
304 (4th Cir. 2009) (fifteen states joining as amici supporting petitioner Piedmont).
140. See supra notes 24-26.
141. See supra notes 77-79.
142. Cf supra notes 139 (listing states involved in litigation) and 24-26 (outlining state
renewable energy incentives).
143. See Ashley C. Brown & Jim Rossi, Siting Transmission Lines in a Changed Milieu: Evolv-
ing Notions of the "Public Interest" in Balancing State and Regional Considerations, 81 U. CoLo. L.
REv. 705, 751-54 (2010) (describing how state regulators have begun shifting from tradi-
tional concerns of reliability, land use, consumer protection, local air and water quality, or
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However, the actions of the states in pursuing this series of lawsuits
shows that states have made their choice, and that a similar set of
objections can be expected if a plan that fully preempts the state
role in transmission siting were proposed.
CONCLUSION
Events like 2010's wasteful shutdown of installed wind generation
are harmful to our economy and threaten the future of renewable
power. They are also preventable. There may still be substantial
technological and economic progress to be made before wind, so-
lar, and other clean energy sources can supplant or substantially
reduce the use of coal, petroleum, or natural gas; however, that is
no reason to maintain a legal system that stymies such progress,
especially when states and the federal government are so heavily
invested in the success of these technologies.
One of the most substantial legal challenges that stands between
us and a clean energy future is the byzantine set of state and re-
gional rules that hinder the construction of new electric
transmission lines. Most utility-grade renewable resources are in re-
mote areas, far from the populous regions that require their power.
Linking them into the existing grid requires the approval of multi-
ple jurisdictions, some of which are forbidden by state law from
considering any benefits that accrue to non-residents.
To overcome this problem, Congress should pass a statute grant-
ing the FERC the authority to make siting decisions so as to cut
through the bureaucratic processes that currently hold up renewa-
ble energy development. This statute should include the best
practices of prior federal siting regulatory schemes to ensure that
local voices and other values are not lost, but are instead balanced
against the need to realize important national priorities. This is a
substantial change for the power industry and will likely meet signif-
icant opposition from entrenched interests. But it is an essential
reform if we hope to create an environment in which the techno-
logical and economic advances of the green power industry can be
applied to their full capacity.
other parochial concerns to out-of-jurisdiction concerns, such as regional energy production
and climate change, but noting that such changes are "the exception and not the rule" and
are limited by the lack of universal acceptance of such principles).
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